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INTRODUCTION 
This paper contains first results and interpretations of analyses of possible relationships 
between quality incentives and quality outcome for procured public transport services by the 
Stockholm County Public Transport Authority (SL).  
 
The work will be finalised in the end of 2008 and is financed by the Swedish Governmental 
Agency for Innovation Systems (Vinnova) and by the Stockholm County Public Transport 
Authority. 
 
In 1988 a new act in Sweden allowed (but did not mandate) local and regional public 
transport authorities to procure public transport services under competition. The authorities 
are all in charge of planning, i.e. tactical decisions, but can thus since then procure the 
operations under competition. 
 
In 1991 SL launched its first competitive tenders. Between 1989 and 1991 the in-house 
operator of SL was given a couple of years for strengthening of its competitiveness in order to 
be able to meet the coming competition from private operators. In fact, operating costs went 
down some 30 percent before the first tender round, by the mere threat of competition. 
 
Gothenburg in Sweden applied a similar procedure with similar results. In 2006 all local and 
regional public transport authorities in Sweden has procured services under competition. 
 
More information on how the Swedish policy on (land-based) public transport evolved around 
1990 is found in Jansson and Wallin (1991). 
 
In the longer run since 1991 competitive tendering in Sweden has reduced costs by some 5-10 
percent on average. The cost outcome of procurement of bus transport in Stockholm, and in 
Sweden in general, has been the topic in several studies (e.g., Jansson, 1993; Alexandersson 
et al., 1996; Alexandersson and Pyddoke, 2003). 
 
Research in terms of quality, however, has not been reported very much. This is a certainly a 
deficiency. Not much seems to be reported in the literature on effects of incentives for quality 
improvements either. That is at least one conclusion drawn by Jansson and Pyddoke (2007), a 
literature study on behalf of the Stockholm County Public Transport Authority (SL). This 
paper makes an effort to provide a contribution in the field: quality incentives – quality 
outcome. 
SL is the public transport authority in Sweden that has experimented with the largest number 
of incentives and has the largest number of quality measurements. That is the reason why SL 
is the best candidate in Sweden for analyses of quality incentives - quality outcomes. 
 
The reason for these experiments is of course the belief that quality incentives will lead to 
quality improvements. The main finding in this paper is that the incentives do not work 
satisfactorily. Probable reasons may be that the incentives are too weak, too little related to 
the passengers’ valuation of quality and that there are, at least so far, unknown factors that we 
have not taken into account but that affect the performance of the operators.  
 
Section 2 includes a principal discussion on the economic rationale for various incentives and 
how SL has dealt with incentives historically. Section 3 describes the methodology employed 
and structure of analyses. Section 4 presents the results structured according to the various 
incentives. Main conclusions are presented in section 5. The appendix includes listing of the 
type of data that the Stockholm County Public Transport Authority (SL) collects for quality 
measurement purposes. 
 
DISCUSSION OF PRINCIPLES 
Incentive Forms 
We assume that a public transport authority, as SL, is welfare maximising, while competing 
operators are profit maximising. 
 
The economic rationale for incentives in contracts is to make the operator act so that one 
achieves the largest possible social net benefit. Incentives are thus often regarded as important 
tools by public transport authorities, in order to make procurement of public transport services 
work satisfactorily. 
 
In this paper we analyse gross-cost contracts since these are used by SL. Common incentive 
schemes when gross-cost contracts are used are related to: 
 
• number of passengers 
• revenue 
• quality in terms of departures carried out 
• quality in terms of punctuality 
• quality in terms of cleanliness 
• quality in terms of staff behaviour 
• quality in terms of information. 
 
Incentives related to number of passengers or revenues are problematic in two senses. 
 
The main problem is that it is very difficult to know the reason for the changes in the number 
of passengers or revenue. The reasons may be for example: changes in the land-use pattern, 
changes of cost of driving cars, measures taken by the transport authority, measures taken by 
some operator that affect other operators’ demand. 
 
The other related problem is that the transport authority may avoid undertaking (valuable) 
measures in order not to disturb the distribution of demand between operators. 
 
All in all it is difficult, if not even impossible, to derive the exact relationship between 
possible measures undertaken by the operator and demand changes. The conclusion is that 
one should be very careful and restrictive if demand or revenue incentives are considered. 
 
More passengers should be no main goal. This is valuable only as long as it means an increase 
of net social benefit. The benefit of more passengers is related to higher revenues, less car 
traffic and thus less pollution. These effects should, however, be taken into account in a cost-
benefit analysis.  
 
Theoretical arguments and numerical examples of shortcomings of demand and revenue 
related incentives are found in for example Jansson (1997). 
 
Quality incentives  
Quality incentives with respect to for example departures carried out, punctuality, cleanliness, 
staff behaviour, information, punctuality etc. are easier to deal with. Hereby one needs to rely 
on controls of staff, technical recordings and complaints from passengers.  
 
SL in Stockholm applies all these sources. Complaints and opinions from passengers are 
collected by telephone, e-mail and interviews. SL also uses “mystery shoppers”, who are 
plainly dressed consultants who travel as passengers with the task to examine quality in 
various respects. A list of the quality measurements used by SL is found in the appendix. 
 
In earlier work on behalf of the Stockholm County Public Transport Authority (SL), Jansson 
(2002) and Eriksson and Jansson (2002) concluded that the quality incentives used by SL 
were too “toothless”. The amount of money for bonus and penalties were very small 
compared to the contract sums, implying that one could not expect the driving force in these 
incentives to be strong. 
 
Another problem found was that incentives were mainly related to arbitrarily chosen 
percentage figures. Bonus or penalty was paid if a quality parameter was over and under 
respectively a certain objective. A certain bonus is paid if the accepted number of late 
departures operator is below 95 percent, another, higher, bonus is paid if the accepted number 
of late departures operator is below 96 percent etc. A certain bonus is paid if, according to 
interviews, 75 percent of the passengers are satisfied with the service, another, higher, bonus 
is paid if 80 percent of the passengers are satisfied with the service etc. Similar percentage 
rules are sometimes used also for penalties. 
 
Of course such percentage rules may work, if they work at all, in the right direction. But the 
problem was and is that these rules in many cases have no connection to the passengers’ 
valuations of quality (willingness to pay). The rules also ignore that it is not only the number 
of late departures that matters, but also how late they are. 
 
In this context Jansson (2002) also discusses the trade-off between valuation and cost. The 
authority naturally wants to pay the operator the minimum amount for achieving a certain 
quality level, but two conditions are necessary for a quality improving measure to be 
undertaken from a welfare point of view: 
 
 
• The benefits to the passengers must exceed the cost for the operator, 
• The payment to the operator should not exceed the passengers valuation of the 
quality aspect  
 
If condition 1) is satisfied the payment should ideally be just above the cost. 
 
A problem is now that the authority hardly ever knows the cost for the operator to improve 
quality. This asymmetric information may, however, not be that serious. If bonuses and 
penalties for improving and worsening quality reflect the willingness to pay, then the operator 
will make a decision that increases welfare. If the cost for the operator for improvements 
exceeds the bonus, the improvement measure will not and shall not be undertaken. If the cost 
for the operator for improvements is below the bonus, the improvement measure will and 
should be undertaken. Another matter is that one cannot easily know whether a welfare 
optimum is reached. 
 
So far most of the quality incentives used by SL are of the percentage style, without 
connection to valuations of the passengers. There is, however, one exception that is discussed 
in the section below. 
 
Quality incentive with respect to punctuality  
Many interviews with SL passengers indicate that lack of reliability in terms of departures and 
punctuality is the most serious problem.  
 
On behalf of SL, Jansson (2004) carried out a work on improvements of incentives related to 
punctuality. First we describe briefly the recommendation by Jansson and then the new 
incentive scheme that was actually implemented by Stockholm County Public Transport 
Authority (SL) for the contracted area Södertälje in 2006. 
 
Recommendation 
The same principle for bonus and penalty can in fact be used for: 
 
• late departure, 
• early departure, 
• cancelled departure. 
 
All of these deficiencies cause delay and may thus be called delay. 
 
The recommendation is that the operator should be rewarded for improvement based on the 
passengers valuation of punctuality and if symmetrically penalised for degradation of 
punctuality. 
 
The passengers perceive waiting time at stops as more uncomfortable than riding time. 
Waiting time when the bus is late is perceived as normal wait time at the stop. Too early 
departure means that the passenger has to wait the whole interval till next departure. 
 
As the basis for the cost of delay the value of ride time was assumed to be 2 € per hour. The 
value of waiting time at the stop is assumed to be 3 times higher, that is 6 € per hour, i.e., the 
weight of waiting time is 3 times larger than riding time. Several studies indicate that the 
value of delay time is much higher. It was here assumed to be on the average the double 
compared to normal wait time, i.e., 12 € per hour. The assumed weight of delay time was thus 
6 times larger than the value of ride time. 
 
The value of delay time was also assumed to increase progressively with the delay time. The 
weight of delay time should be 3 when the delay time is zero, i.e., equal to the weight of 
normal wait time. The weight 6 was assumed to relate to 8 minutes delay time. When the 
delay grows over 8 minutes also the weight grows progressively. 
A delay smaller than one minute was assumed to cause so little nuisance that it should not 
give rise to penalty. 
 
Implementation 
Stockholm County Public Transport Authority (SL) applies a principle that is similar to the 
recommendation since 2006 for the contract area Södertälje. SL thus relates the bonus and the 
penalty to the passengers´ valuation of delay per minute. The difference is that they do not 
take into account a progressive cost but a linear one, which they thought was easier to 
understand for the operators.  0.5 minutes delay gives rise to no bonus or penalty. Delays less 
than 0.5 minutes give bonus and delays over 0.5 minutes give penalty. 
 
SL acquires their information about delay minutes from their automatic traffic measurement 
system (ATR). This system measures the number of boarding passengers and the time at each 
stop for a sample of departures.  
 
METHODOLOGY AND STRUCTURE OF ANALYSES 
Method 
In this preliminary report on some exploratory regressions we have used no sophisticated 
econometric methods. We have used plain ordinary least squares regression techniques to 
estimate the effects of incentives and to control for a number of variables that may influence 
the outcome measures. 
 
One shall keep in mind that for most estimations the incentive variables are dummy variables, 
so that all other changes that may coincide with the period designated by a dummy variable 
will be caught by the dummy. 
 
Structure 
We present the results of the analyses with respect to the different incentives that have been 
used as explanatory policy variables. These are the following variables describing incentives: 
 
• Punctuality, measured either as late departures (LATE) or timely departures 
(TIMELY) 
• Cancelled departures (CANCELLED) 
• Bus at departure stop in advance (ADVANCE) 
• Validation of tickets (VALIDATION) 
• Cleanliness, staff behaviour, information (CLEAN, STAFF, INFO) 
 
As complementary, exogenous, explanatory variables we have used: 
 
• The number of days in a month with more than 5 mm of precipitation in 
Stockholm (PRECIPITATION) 
• Speed (bus only), except bus stops, used as a proxy for congestion (SPEED) 
• The number of boarding passengers (PASSENGERS) 
 
The reason for using the variable PRECIPITATION is the idea that increased precipitation, on 
average, may decrease the timeliness of public transport, for buses all year round and for rail 
in wintertime (snow).  
 
The reason for the variable SPEED is the idea that more congested streets may lead to 
increased difficulties in producing timely departures for buses.  
 
The reason for the variable PASSENGERS is the idea that more passengers boarding will, on 
average, also delay the service in question. 
 
We have analysed possible relationships quality incentives – quality outcome for the 
following contract areas, but not in the same way for all of them: 
 
Bus services 
 
• Råsta-Solna 
• Råsta-Sollentuna 
• Solna-Sundbyberg 
• Söderort 
 
Underground services 
 
• Green line 
• Red line 
• Blue line 
 
Commuter rail services 
 
The following quality outcomes have been used, but not the same for all analyses: 
 
• Ranking according to passenger complaints (COMPLAINT) 
• Punctuality, measured either as late departures (LATE) or timely departures 
(TIMELY) 
• Bus at terminal stop in advance (ADVANCE) 
 
In some cases we have also used the following reasons for cancellations that the operator 
itself is obliged to report to the authority SL: 
 
• Actions by the Swedish National Rail Administration (Banverket, BV), 
• Actions by the operator (OPERATOR) 
• Actions by the authority (AUTHORITY) 
• Lack of staff (STAFF), 
• Lack of vehicles (VEHICLES) 
• Track problems (TRACK) 
• Other factors (OTHER). 
 
RESULTS 
Punctuality 
We have analysed the effects of punctuality incentives for bus, commuter trains and 
underground, on the timeliness of arrivals and departures. These analyses have been done for 
different sub series of data from 1996 to 2006. In all of the analysed series there have been 
quantitative or qualitative changes in the form of the incentive. For most of these cases the 
changes is modelled with a dummy variable taking the value 0 before the increase in intensity 
of the incentive and the value 1 afterwards. For the commuter trains it has been meaningful to 
model changes quantitatively as increases in intensity. 
 
Here are the results of the regressions of punctuality on the different variables chosen to 
model effects of incentives and to control for other circumstances that may influence the 
operators´ ability to achieve punctuality. 
 
Table 4.1.1:  Regression of causes for late departures for Söderort from  
January 1996 to December 2003 
 
 Coefficients t-values 
CONSTANT 116,68 5,06 
INCENTIVE LATE -5,69 -3,63 
PASSENGERS -0,0008 -2,36 
SPEED -2,21 -2,45 
PRECIPITATION  0,24 1,00 
 
 
In this regression punctuality is measured by an index of late departures LATE. So the 
incentive decreases the number of late departures. It has the “right” sign. 
 
In the following regressions punctuality is measured by an index of timely departures 
TIMELY.  
 
Table 4.1.2:  Regression of causes for timely departures for Söderort from  
January 2000 to December 2006 
 
  Coefficients t-values 
CONSTANT 83,41 15,75 
INCENTIVE TIMELY -0,564 -1,86 
PASSENGERS 0,021 1,35 
SPEED 0,336 1,93 
PRECIPITATION 0,072 1,15 
 
 
Since the incentive decreases the number of timely departures it has the “wrong” sign. 
 
Table 4.1.3:  Regression of causes for timely departures for Södertälje from  
January 2000 to December 2006 
 
 Coefficients t-values 
CONSTANT 87,68 8,89 
INCENTIVE TIMELY -2,99 -4,74 
PASSENGERS -0,09 -2,23 
SPEED 0,349 1,38 
PRECIPITATION -0,138 -2,34 
 
 
Since the incentive decreases the number of timely departures it has the “wrong” sign and 
with large significance. 
 
Table 4.1.4:  Regression of causes for timely departures for commuter trains from 
January 2000 to December 2006 
 
 Coefficients t-values 
CONSTANT 1,01 1,23 
INCENTIVE TIMELY 0,016 1,25 
PRECIPITATION -0,106 -1,84 
 
For commuter rail services the incentive has the right sign but not very significant. 
 
Table 4.1.5: Regression of causes for timely departures for underground blue line from 
January 2000 to December 2006 
 
 Coefficients t-values 
CONSTANT 100,9 103,14 
INCENTIVE TIMELY -3,118 -9,55 
PASSENGERS -0,0174 -3,05 
PRECIPITATION -0,0872 -1,72 
 
Since the incentive decreases the number of timely departures it has the “wrong” sign and 
with large significance. 
 
 
Table 4.1.6:  Regression of causes for timely departures for underground red line from 
January 2000 to December 2006 
 
 Coefficients t-values 
CONSTANT 99,895 47,582 
INCENTIVE TIMELY -4,140 -5,05 
PASSENGERS -0,016 -3,06 
PRECIPITATION 0,012 0,10 
 
Since the incentive decreases the number of timely departures it has the “wrong” sign and 
with large significance. 
 
Except for Söderort and commuter rail services we find a negative effect from the incentives 
in the above analyses. How can this come, since the incentive itself theoretically should have 
a positive effect? Even though we try to control for other circumstances that may have 
adverse effects on timeliness our prime hypothesis is that we have not yet successfully 
controlled for some important reason for declining timeliness. 
 
We do, however, interpret these results, as an indication that the magnitude of the incentives 
used so far may not have been large enough to favourably influence the motivations of 
operators to really change behaviour and produce more timely departures. 
 
Remember that the dummy variable construction of the incentive variable will catch all other 
changes that coincide with the period designated by the dummy variable.  
 
Let us also comment on the estimated effects of the control variables. We find that SPEED 
has no significant impact on timeliness, although the estimated coefficient has the “right” sign 
in the two later estimations. 
 
We find that the estimated sign of the coefficient for PASSENGERS varies and that its 
significance also varies. In most cases the estimate has the right sign and is statistically 
significant. Disturbingly we find that more boardings in Söderort has a positive effect on 
timeliness, but this effect is not statistically significant. 
 
PRECIPITATION seems to affect timeliness in various directions and may not have any real 
effect.  
 
Cancelled departures 
The effects of incentives for cancelled departures on the total number of cancelled departures 
have been analysed for bus and commuter trains. These analyses have been done for different 
sub series of data from 1996 to 2006. In all of the analysed series there have been quantitative 
or qualitative changes in the form of the incentive. For most of these cases the changes is 
modelled with a dummy variable taking the value 0 before the increase in intensity of the 
incentive and the value 1 afterwards. For the commuter trains it has been meaningful to model 
changes quantitatively as increases successively in terms of monetary values. 
 
Below we present the results of the regressions of cancelled departures on incentives and the 
precipitation to control for a factor that may influence the operator’s ability to achieve 
departures. We have also chosen to present the different causes that the operators are obliged 
to report for cancelled departures. 
 
Table 4.2.1:  Regression of causes for cancelled departures for Söderort from  
January 2000 to December 2006 
 
  Coefficients t-values 
CONSTANT 0,345 4,958 
INCENTIVE 0,062 0,963 
PRECIPITATION -0,003 -0,253 
 
Table 4.2.2:  Causes for cancelled departures for Söderort from  
January 2000 to December 2006 
 
 STAFF VEHICLES OTHER 
Average share of cause for cancelled departures 0,25 0,62 0,12 
 
Both the tasks of manning the vehicles and the provision of functioning vehicles should be 
tasks that could be performed without hindrance by the operators. Apparently the operator has 
difficulties to put out staff and vehicles on the road in spite of the incentive. 
 
 
Table 4.2.3:  Regression of causes for cancelled departures for Södertälje from  
January 2000 to December 2006 
 
  Coefficients t-values 
CONSTANT 46,824 5,056018 
INCENTIVE 47,237 1,745952 
PRECIPITATION 0,250 0,103278 
 
Table 4.2.4:  Causes for cancelled departures for Södertälje from  
January 2000 to December 2006 
 
 STAFF VEHICLES OTHER 
Average share of cause for cancelled departures 0,32 0,56 0,11 
 
 
Apparently the operator in Södertälje has had similar difficulties to put out staff and vehicles 
on the road. 
 
Below we see the regression results for commuter trains. 
 
 
Table 4.2.5:  Regression of causes for timely departures for commuter trains from 
January 2002 to December 2006 
 
  Coefficients t-values 
CONSTANT 1,005 1,23 
INCENTIVE 0,017 1,25 
PRECIPITATION -0,106 -1,84 
 
 
Below we see the reasons for cancellations as reported by the commuter rail operator. In most 
cases the operator assigns the responsibility to himself. The second largest reason is that the 
rail track agency has failed in some way. 
 
Table 4.2.6:  Causes for cancelled departures for the Commuter trains from  
January 2002 to December 2005 
 
 OPERATOR PUBLIC 
TRANSPORT 
AUTHORITY 
TRACK 
AUTHORITY 
OTHER 
Average share of 
causes for 
cancelled 
departure 
0,44 0,02 0,39 0,15 
 
 
The effects of the incentive variables are all positive. That is, the incentives increase the 
number of cancelled departures. This is clearly the “wrong” sign again. In the two cases of 
bus contracts the effects of the incentives are significantly different from naught. But in the 
case of commuter trains it is not. 
 
Again, how can it come that the incentive is negative? We have some data on causes for 
cancellations given by the operators, for which we have, so far, done only some preliminary 
analysis.  
 
Remember that the dummy variable construction of the incentive variable will catch all other 
changes that coincide with the period designated by the dummy variable. 
 
The PRECIPITATION variable appears to have only very weak and insignificant effects on 
cancellations. 
 
Bus at departure stop in advance 
The effects of incentives for a timely appearance at departure point before departure on the 
total number of minutes in advance at departure stop have been analysed for buses only. 
These analyses have been done only for period 1996 to 2003. In all of the analysed series 
there have been quantitative or qualitative changes in the form of the incentive. For these two 
cases the changes is modelled with a dummy variable taking the value 0 before the increase in 
intensity of the incentive and the value 1 afterwards.  
 
Below we see the results of the regressions of timely appearance at departure point before 
departure dependent on incentives and on the variables chosen to control for other 
circumstances that may influence.  
 
Table 4.3.1:  Regression of causes for a timely appearance at departure point before 
departure in Råsta-Solna from  
January 1996 to December 2003 
 
  Coefficients t-values 
CONSTANT 8,34 2,68 
INCENTIVE 0,63 4,16 
PASSENGERS 0,000054 0,88 
SPEED -0,23 -2,156 
PRECIPITATION -0,00007 -0,003 
 
Table 4.3.2:  Regression of causes for a timely appearance at departure point before 
departure in Råsta-Sollentuna from  
January 1996 to December 2003 
 
  Coefficients t-values 
CONSTANT 0,27 0,12 
INCENTIVE -0,68 -5,61 
PASSENGERS 0,00001 0,03 
SPEED 0,11 1,66 
PRECIPITATION 0,01 0,53 
 
 
In this dataset the timely appearance in advance at the departure stop is measured as the total 
number of minutes in advance. Therefore more minutes are better. We can see that the 
incentive has one positive and one negative result, both significantly different from nought. 
The first sign is the “right” sign.  
 
Remember that the dummy variable construction of the incentive variable will catch all other 
changes that coincide with the period designated by the dummy variable. 
 
None of the control variables SPEED, PASSENGERS or PRECIPITATION appear to have a 
stably significant effect on this objective. 
 
Cleanliness, staff behaviour and information 
In this section we examine the effects of incentives for cleanliness in vehicles, staff behaviour 
(service attitude) and information on the total number of complaints. These are examined for 
buses only. The analysis covers the period from 1996 to 2003. In the analysed series there has 
been a change in the form of the incentive. This change is modelled with a dummy variable 
taking the value 0 before the increase in intensity of the incentive and the value 1 afterwards.  
 
Below we can see the results of the incentives for cleanliness in vehicles, staff behaviour 
(service attitude) and information and the control variables on the total number of complaints.  
 
Table 4.4.1:  Regression of cleanliness in vehicles, staff behaviour (service attitude) and 
information in Råsta-Sollentuna from  
January 1996 to December 2003 
 
 Coefficients t-values 
CONSTANT 169,6 0,59 
INCENTIVE CLEAN, STAFF, INFO 6,0 0,36 
INCENTIVE TIMELY 33,9 2,00 
INCENTIVE VALIDATION -29,7 -2,39 
PRECIPITATION 3,9 2,35 
SPEED -9,4 -0,90 
PASSENGERS 0,007 2,57 
 
The estimation cannot distinguish the three different incentives as they were implemented 
simultaneously. The three incentives for cleanliness in vehicles, staff behaviour (service 
attitude) and information have increased the total number of complaints. This is of course the 
“wrong” sign again. This effect is, however, not significantly different from nought.  
 
In this estimation we also included the incentives for timely departure and validation of 
tickets. The incentive for timely departure is estimated to have a positive effect on the total 
number of complaints, which is obviously “wrong” also. The incentive for validation of 
tickets is estimated to have a negative effect, which may be interpreted so that passengers do 
not appreciate too cautious bus drivers. 
 
As in the previous cases remember that the dummy variable construction of the incentive 
variable will catch all other changes that coincide with the period designated by the dummy 
variable. 
 
We have not tested for multicollinearity but this should be a small problem as the dummy 
series are not close. 
 
With respect to the control variables we note that more precipitation has a statistically 
significant positive effect on the total number of complaints. Increased speed (that is less 
congestion) reduces the total number of complaints. This estimate is not significantly different 
from nought. A larger number of boarding passengers increases the total number of 
complaints. This estimate is significant. 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Belief and Aim 
A belief held by the Stockholm County Public Transport Authority (SL) and many other 
public transport authorities in Sweden and other countries is that quality incentives will lead 
to quality improvements.  
 
The aim of this project is to examine relationships between quality incentives and quality 
outcome for the County of Stockholm and, based on the results, hopefully be able to 
recommend certain changes of the incentive structure. The results presented here stem from 
the beginning of this project, which will last till December 2008. So far we have only 
analysed data between 1996 and 2006. 
 
Below we provide some more comments from this and an earlier study of ours, interpretations 
of reasons for the counterintuitive results and finally some issues for further contemplation. 
 
Result of earlier study 
In a previous pilot study financed by Vinnova, Jansson and Pyddoke (2005) compared 
samples of the quality outcome measurements before and after an incentive has been 
introduced and calculated if the differences in averages were statistically significantly 
different from naught. If the difference was statistically significant and had the desired sign 
this could indicate that the incentive had worked well.  
 
The statistical tests for three contract areas suggested that four incentives worked well and 
had the desired effects and that three incentives did not work well, whereas two incentives did 
not seem to have any significant effect at all. From this we concluded that the full set of 
incentives for the whole set of bus contracts may not have produced the desired quality 
improvements and a positive welfare net. A more definite conclusion on the efficacy of the 
quality incentives would clearly have been premature from this study, since we had not 
controlled for other circumstances that may have influenced the outcomes. The study did 
however show that both data and methods allow for meaningful evaluation of the design of 
individual incentives and that these methods could be applied to the whole set of contracts. 
 
Result of on-going study 
In the ongoing study we have made an effort to seek ways to control for other factors that may 
influence the operator’s possibilities to achieve the public transport authority’s objective.  
 
The results up to now indicate that the quality incentives employed by SL have no or even a 
negative effect on quality outcome. In theory this effect should of course be positive. 
Therefore we believe there must be other reasons. 
 
We have found that the operators have difficulties to put in vehicles and staff when and where 
they should, in spite of the incentives. This fact underpins the suspicion that incentives are too 
weak, i.e., that the costs for the operator to meet a goal are larger than the penalty for not 
meeting it. 
 
Interpretations of reasons for counterintuitive results 
Below we try to list various hypothetical reasons for the maybe unexpected results of the 
effects of quality incentives. 
 
• The introduction of quality incentives and quality measurements by SL seems to 
have proceeded in a somewhat ad hoc fashion. There does not seem to have been 
any conscious plan to evaluate incentives. 
• The number of incentives is large and varying and it is not always clear why a 
particular incentive or design of incentive has been chosen.  
• Most incentives seem much too complex and too much related to fulfilment of 
certain percentages.   
• The money value of bonuses and penalties may be too low compared to the cost 
of actually implementing improving measures. 
• Some incentives, mainly the new punctuality incentive, is calculated based on 
estimates of passengers willingness to pay for waiting and delay time, may need 
more time till it works satisfactorily. 
• Even though we try to control for other circumstances that may have adverse 
effects on the objectives, our prime hypothesis is that we have not yet successfully 
controlled for some important reasons for declining timeliness. 
 
Preliminary recommendations and what to do? 
As mentioned above in section 2.2 we have indications that the magnitude of the incentives 
have been significantly below the willingness to pay of passengers. If this is the case 
incentives may not be large enough to give operators the full motivation to pursue quality to a 
socially optimal degree. A preliminary recommendation is that SL increases the monetary 
values of bonuses and penalties to the willingness to pay level. 
 
We do not know the operators costs for achieving the objectives. An advantage when 
willingness to pay based payments are used is that the authority then does not have to know 
the costs.  Such willingness to pay based incentives are, however, used only for one incentive 
and in one contract area: punctuality in Södertälje. This new punctuality incentive may be a 
possible solution. A preliminary recommendation is that SL introduces more incentives 
related to willingness to pay.  
 
If incentives do not work as well as they are supposed to, one may have to consider the costs 
of administrating the incentives in relation to the effects of the incentives A preliminary 
recommendation is that SL tries to make incentives less complex, which would save costs 
both for SL and the operators. 
 
An open question is if we have ignored some important exogenous variables that would be 
possible to include in an analysis of this kind.  
 
An open question is also if there are other studies, which we are not aware of, on the 
relationship between quality incentives and quality that could help to improve on the analyses.  
 
We will in this study go on with taking in more bus contract areas and we will make use of 
new incentive and measurement data from 2007 and 2008. We will also try to find more 
useful control variables. Whether some incentives then tend to work the way they should 
remains to be seen. 
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APPENDIX: DATA COLLECTED BY SL 
SL has several different datasets relevant for our purpose. SL has also by itself and by 
commissioning various consultants conducted a number of studies of quality in bus transport. 
Therefore data is scattered in several sources. For this project we have also hired the 
consultant ÅF-Infraplan for collection and generation of input data. The type of measured 
quality data that SL collects is presented below. 
 
A.1 Cancelled departures 
The operator in charge of a particular bus line records cancellations. For each cancellation the 
operator pays a fine. If SL detects that an operator fails to report a cancelled departure and SL 
the fine charged is significantly higher. 
 
A.2 Quality monitoring 
Since 2003 SL procures a consultant firm to monitor a set of quality dimensions by so called 
“mystery shoppers” who travel in the bus system and record the following dimensions. 
 
• cleanliness of the vehicles, 
• presence of litter, 
• presence of graffiti, 
• cleanliness of bus stops,  
• graffiti at bus stops, 
• the service attitude of personnel, 
• if the bus driver calls out bus stop names 
 
A.3 Passenger complaints  
Passengers can complain by telephone or e-mail. The complaints are categorized as follows 
• the state of a bus stop or terminal 
• the state of the vehicle 
• the conduct of personnel 
• the quality of traffic in terms of for example cancelled or delayed trips. 
 
A.4 Technical punctuality 
For this quality dimension automatic equipment is mounted on the vehicles. This equipment is 
circulated systematically among vehicles and different lines during a year. The equipment 
registers deviations in arrival and departure times compared to schedule as well as if the bus 
arrives at the terminal stop before departure time, as it should. 
 
A.5 Interviews with passengers  
A total of 20 000 passenger interviews are conducted during spring and autumn each year. 
Passengers rate the services in the following dimensions: 
• punctuality 
• conduct of personnel 
• driving performance 
• cleanliness of vehicle 
• cleanliness of bus stop 
• quality of information about delays and cancellations 
